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INTRODUCTION
　For OECD/DAC members, one of the actors they have part-
nered with are civil society organizations （CSOs）. DAC mem-
bers in total allocated about 15% of their bilateral official devel-
opment assistance （ODA） in 2017. Seven members spent over 
25% of ODA to and through CSOs. Donors in Western Europe, 
North America and Southern Pacific have partnered with CSOs 
—or NGOs in the 20th-century terminology—since the mid-
1960s to 1970s. 
　Partnering with CSOs is a new idea for Northeast Asian do-
nors—South Korea, Japan （DAC members） and Taiwan （a 
non-DAC member but reports its aid statics to the DAC）. Ja-
pan established funding schemes for supporting CSOs in 1989, 
and Korea in 1995, while Taiwan has not yet established 
schemes. Korea allocates only 2.7% of ODA to and through 
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1  This article was originally prepared as a paper for the joint 
conference of Japan Society for International Development （JASID） 
and Japan Association of Human Security Studies （JAHSS） on 
November 17, 2019 at the University of Tokyo Komaba Campus. I am 
grateful to my Canadian friends in the academia, CSOs and the GAC 
for their support for my research during my visits to Canada. I would 
also like to thank Masaaki Ohashi and  Tatsufumi Yamagata for their 
comments at the JASID session, and Sujung Nam, Minyoung Kim and 
Shiuh-Shen Chien for their participation as presenters at the session.
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CSOs,2 and Japan only 1.8%. Taiwan is estimated to have allo-
cated 2.61% of its ODA for CSOs. What lessons can Northeast 
Asian donors draw from the experiences of the “pioneer” coun-
tries in partnering with CSOs is the topic I want to discuss in 
this article. This article especially focuses on Canada, whose 
history of partnering with NGOs/CSOs goes back to the time 
the Canadian International Development Agency （CIDA） was 
established in 1968.3 Canada was once considered to be a coun-
try whose NGO programs were innovative and effective 
（Brushett 2019）.
　The DAC acknowledges CSOs as independent development 
actors in their own right and important partners in internation-
al development （Wood and Fallman 2019）. Actually, generally 
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Figure 1 : Aid to and through CSOs （2017）: %
Source, OECD （2019a）
 
2  Aid to NGOs means official contributions to programs and activities 
which NGOs have developed themselves, and which they implement 
on their own authority and responsibility. Aid through NGOs means 
payments by the official sector for NGOs to implement projects and 
programmes which the official sector has developed, and for which it 
is ultimately responsible （Wood and Fallman 2019）.
3  Even before the establishment of CIDA, there was funding to NGOs.
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speaking, donor policies and practices in partnering with CSOs 
always involved tensions between respecting CSOs as indepen-
dent actors in their own right and enabling them to operate 
based on CSOs’ own objectives and priorities, and controlling or 
instrumentalizing CSOs based on donors’ policies and priorities. 
Looking at the 50 years of CSO-government partnership in Can-
ada, it is a history of this tension. What lessons can we draw 
from the Canadian experience?
1 ． EARLY DAYS OF THE PARTNERSHIP PROGRAMS IN 
CANADA
　Canada, like other bilateral donors, started its partnership 
program in the form of responsive co-financing of NGO-initiated 
projects. Funding for NGOs started from about C$ 3 million 
（1.5% of ODA） in 1968, and by 1990 grew to more than C$ 300 
million （11.0% of ODA）. According to Lewis Perinbam, CIDA’s 
Vice President for Special Program’s Branch （which dealt with 
NGO funding） from 1974 to 1991, the principles for CIDA’s 
funding to NGOs in the early days had been to respect the in-
dependence and integrity of NGOs, and that instead of CIDA 
taking initiative, CIDA co-finances projects and programs that 
are under initiative of NGOs.4
　In addition to the responsive programs, several new schemes 
started in the 1980s, including;
・non-responsive program: NGOs implementing bilateral aid
・ program funding to NGOs （and later institutional funding for 
 
4  Lewis Perinbam’s lecture at Japan NGO Center for International 
Cooperation （JANIC）, May 19, 1990. See Brushett （2019） on the 
works of Perinbam.
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NGOs with proven records）
・direct funding for Southern NGOs
・funding NGO coalitions
　The rapid growth of CIDA funding was one of the factors 
that led to the rapid expansion of Canadian NGOs. In addition 
to Canadian branches （later affiliations） of international CSOs 
（like Oxfam, Care, Plan, World Vision, etc.）, faith-based （mainly 
Christian） groups and volunteer-sending NGOs, many new 
groups were established in the 1970s and 80s. By the 1990s, 
around 40% of the income of Canadian international develop-
ment NGOs came from CIDA. Also, after the mid-1990s, 55 to 
60 CSOs received institutional （core） funding. The Other side 
of the coin of the enhanced partnership between NGOs and 
CIDA was a situation, in the words of Ian Smillie （1995）, “When 
CIDA sneezes, NGOs reach for vitamin C.” 
2 ．GROWING DIFFICULTIES: 1990s AND EARLY 2000s 5
　But in the 1990s, there were increased voices – sometimes 
from the Foreign Affairs and other parts of the government, 
and sometimes from within CIDA – to align NGO funding to aid 
policy priorities. Behind this was the changing environment of 
Canada’s aid policy: while after the end of the Cold War, sup-
porting former Soviet Union and Eastern European countries’ 
transition to market economy became an important issue to 
work on through aid, Canada also had to decrease ODA to tack-
le with the budget deficit problem. Brodhead and Pratt （1996） 
 
5  This section is a summary of Takayanagi （2001: Chapters 5 and 6; 
2003）.
65
wrote:
　 A number of factors have led CIDA to “use” NGOs for a wid-
er range of responsibilities while also developing major new 
programs within which it, rather than the NGOs, identifies 
projects to be supported. As well, CIDA has become more 
selective about the NGOs that it supports and more cautious 
towards the NGOs’ aspiration to greater policy influence... 
The conclusion seems unavoidable: CIDA-NGO relations in 
the next few years will be marked by uncertainty and redefi-
nition, CIDA will increasingly assert closer policy control 
over the NGOs that it assists, and a common NGO approach 
to CIDA and to the government may become impossible to 
sustain.
　What were the things that took place? In 1991, Secor Report, 
a report by a consulting company reviewing the management 
of CIDA, recommended “greater integration of all CIDA-fi-
nanced activities in any country around CIDA’s strategic plan 
for that nation （quoted in Ibid.）.” In late 1992, a leaked 
aide-memoire titled “International Policy Assistance Update,” 
probably prepared by the Department of Foreign Affairs and 
International Trade （DFAIT）, also argued that NGOs should 
be used according to CIDA priorities instead of CIDA respect-
ing NGOs’ initiatives. 
　NGOs’ criticisms on the “International Assistance Policy Up-
date” led to Foreign Policy Review at the Parliament. As a re-
sult of the review, the government published Canada in the 
World: Government Statement, which included the new direc-
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tion of Canada’s foreign policy, including aid policy. Canada in 
the World said, “In consultation with Canadian partners, the 
government will ... develop a framework for a renewed relation-
ship between CIDA and Canadian voluntary organizations 
based on the principle of complementarity of action （Canada 
1994）. Voluntary Sector Paper （VSP） was made as the frame-
work for a renewed relationship （CIDA 1996）.6
　In the consultation between NGOs and CIDA on the VSP, CI-
DA’s early drafts said that “relevance for ODA program priori-
ties and Regional/Country Development Policy Frameworks” 
should be included as the criteria for CSO funding. After strong 
criticisms from CSOs, the final version of VSP did not include 
this phrase. What I learned through my interviews with CIDA 
staff members in different branches in 1997 was the following.7 
There was no consensus within CIDA whether or not the agen-
cy should ask NGOs that they should align their programs with 
CIDA’s country/regional frameworks. It was an occasion of a 
continuing debate within CIDA whether it should respect the 
independence and integrity of NGOs or whether it should 
 
6  Voluntary sector was not synonyms with NGOs. The latter is 
apparently an important part of the former. VSP defined voluntary 
sector as “encompasses a wide range of community, grassroots and 
people’s organizations, development and environmental organizations, 
churches, labor unions, professional associations and cooperatives. All 
are accountable to constituencies or memberships through governing 
structures. Most maintain a financial relationship with government. 
Equally important, all consider themselves as part of a broader civil 
society and are driven by values such as justice, equity and solidarity 
in their international work.”
7  The author’s interviews with CIDA staff members of Partnership, 
Policy, Asia and Americas Branches in July-October 1997.
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strengthen control over them so that CIDA funding would align 
with CIDA’s priorities.
　At the beginning of the 21st century, CIDA was preparing 
another policy document, Strengthening Aid Effectiveness 
（SAE） （in the first draft titled Towards a Long-term Strategy 
for Canada’s International Assistance Program）. SAE （CIDA 
2001） reconfirmed the objectives of Canada’s aid program in 
Canada in the World and said, “poverty reduction should lie at 
the heart of development efforts.” The document rather focused 
on measures and institutional changes to improve the effective-
ness of CIDA’s programs, especially aligning CIDA’s priorities 
with recipients’ Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers （PRSPs）. 
Consultations on this new policy framework document were 
held in several places across the country in September 2001.
　SAE, while appreciating NGOs’ roles not only in service de-
livery but also in policy analysis, advocacy and dialogue, sug-
gested changes in responsive funding. SAE makes the following 
discussions meaning dramatic cutback or even closing of the 
responsive programming:
・ CIDA should use its responsive programs to help promote 
broad, genuinely participatory approaches to the develop-
ment of locally-owned development strategies, such as PRSPs.
・ In countries where governance is weak and unrepresentative 
and where there is no clear, locally owned poverty-reduction 
strategy, CIDA should maintain a smaller bilateral presence... 
and rely on its responsive programming, developed in part-
nership with local organizations, to deliver assistance to those 
whom it is intended.
・ In countries which has developed locally-owned national de-
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velopment strategies... CIDA should use its bilateral pro-
grams as the primary channel for aid delivery. Responsive 
programs should be supported if they conform to these strat-
egies and accord with the roles assigned to CIDA within a 
coordinated donor effort, but not if they fall outside this 
framework. 
　CSOs made strong arguments against this direction in the 
SAE. CSOs argued that in talking about ownership or develop-
ing countries-owned development strategies and aid program-
ming, reduction to government-to-government or state-to-state 
relationship does not assure “ownership by the people” and au-
thentic poverty reduction strategy and programming. There-
fore, responsive programming, independent from strategies or 
frameworks made in government-government relations, is vital 
for supporting the development of independent civil society in 
the South. Criticisms by CSOs led to CIDA’s decision to sus-
pend the idea of aligning CSO responsive funding to recipient 
countries’ national development strategies. 
　Summing up the developments in the 1990s and early 2000s, 
while the government – although there was a lack of coherence 
within the government – on several occasions insisted that 
NGO/CSO funding should align with CIDA’s country priorities. 
NGOs/CSOs opposed the idea and articulated that CIDA’s CSO 
partnership policies and practices should respect CSOs as “ac-
tors in their own right.”
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3 ． DETERIOLARED PARTNERSHIP UNDER STEPHEN 
HARPER’S CONSERVATIVE GOVERNMENT （2006-
2015）8
3.1　Instrumentalization of Aid under the Harper Government
　The first few years of Harper’s Conservative government did 
not witness significant changes in aid policy. There were chang-
es in the way policies were made. After the Conservatives 
came into office in 2006, civil servants were required advance 
approval by the Prime Minister’s Office for making public re-
marks （Brown 2012a）, probably aimed at tightening control 
over the actions of governmental agencies. Also, there were de-
lays in CIDA’s decision-making in funding CSOs.
　Changes in aid policy started to take place in 2009. Interna-
tional Cooperation Minister Bev Oda （in office from August 
2007 to July 2012） announced changes in Canada’s aid priorities. 
Geographically, “Countries of Focus” was changed, increasing 
the number of Latin American countries （including countries 
like Columbia and Peru where Canadian mining industries were 
active: Blackwood and Stewart 2012） and reducing the num-
bers of Sub-Saharan African countries （CIDA 2009a）. Themati-
cally, the priorities set by the Liberal government in 2005; 1） 
promoting good governance, 2） improving health outcomes, 3） 
strengthening basic education, 4） supporting private sector, 5） 
advancing environmental sustainability, and 6） ensuring gender 
equality as a cross-cutting issue; were changed to three; 1） in-
creasing food security, 2） sustainable economic growth, and 3） 
 
8  For detailed analysis of CSO-government partnership under the 
Harper government, see Brown （2012c） and Takayanagi （2016）.
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children and youth （CIDA 2009b）. ODA became increasingly 
instrumentalized for Canadian commercial objectives （Brown 
2016）, and the vision of development behind aid policy changed 
from structural change to growth and charity （Takayanagi 
2015）. 
　On the other hand, the ODA Accountability Act （ODAAA） 
was proposed by Liberal M.P. John McKay as a private mem-
ber bill and was passed by the two houses of the Parliament in 
2008. The Article 4 of the ODAAA says, “Official development 
assistance may be provided only if the competent minister is of 
the opinion that it （a） contributes to poverty reduction; （b） 
takes into account the perspectives of the poor, and （c） is con-
sistent with international human rights standards. The Conser-
vative government said that Canadian aid was already in com-
pliance with ODAAA, but in reality, the government ignored 
the ODAAA’s attempt to reorient aid （Brown 2012b）.
　Although Canada was traditionally a leading country among 
the OECD/DAC in gender and development, during the Harper 
era, “gender equality” was erased from government documents, 
shifting to “equality between men and women” （Tiessen 2016）.
　In 2013, CIDA was amalgamated into the Department of For-
eign affairs and Trade （DFAIT） and the department was re-
named the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Develop-
ment （DFATD）.
3.2　Deteriorated Partnership with CSOs
　After 2009, the government’s attitudes on CSOs changed dra-
matically. Several CSOs such as Kairos （ecumenical internation-
al development and social movement CSO）, Canadian Council 
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for International Cooperation （the CCIC: platform of interna-
tional development CSOs in Canada）, Alternatives and Match 
International were defunded. CIDA never explained reasons for 
defunding, but critical view on Israel （Kairos）, emphasis on 
gender （Match）, active and critical advocacy （CCIC） were 
speculated to be behind the defunding. Other CSOs with pro-
gressive visions faced funding cuts.
　In July 2010, Oda announced changes in CSO funding frame-
work—institutional funding would be terminated and CSOs 
would be funded according to calls for proposals, based on the 
following five principles; 1） sound governance, 2） support of 
Canadians, 3） relevance to CIDA’s mandate and coherence with 
Canadian government policy, 4） results, and 5） development ef-
fectiveness. She also said that 50% of partnership funding 
should be used in 20 countries of focus, and 80% should align 
with the three thematic priorities （CIDA 2010）.
　Thematically or geographically focused calls for proposals 
were made. The only general call for proposal were the ones 
for under $2 million and over $2 million in December 2010.9
3.3　 Restored Partnership? under International Development 
Minister Paradis
　The scene changed dramatically under the International De-
velopment Minister Christian Paradis, the last minister of the 
Harper government （in office from July 2013 to November 
 
9  While the deadline for sending proposals was in March 2011, it was 
only in December 2011 that the accepted proposals were announced. 
CSOs were affected by this delay in decision-making and lack of 
predictability.
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2015）. In May 2014, at the annual forum of CCIC, Paradis an-
nounced that a new civil society partnership policy would be 
made. In the following month, DFATD released a draft （DFA-
TD 2014）, and public consultation was launched. After consulta-
tions and feedbacks from CSOs, etc., the “International Develop-
ment and Humanitarian Assistance Civil Society Partnership 
Policy” was announced in February 2015 （DFATD 2015）. 
　The policy’s guiding principles and commitments included 
ODAAA, （Harper government’s） Canada’s Aid Effectiveness 
Agenda, Busan Partnership for Effective Development, The 
New Deal for Engagement with Fragile States, Principles and 
Good Practices of Humanitarian Donorship and the Istanbul 
Principles for Development Effectiveness. The policy named the 
following “objectives and actions.”
　1） Augment the voice of poor and marginalized people, in-
cluding women and girls
　2） Facilitate an enabling environment for civil society in de-
veloping countries
　3） Foster Canadian leadership in international development 
and innovation
　4） Integrate roles of CSOs as independent development ac-
tors into development programming
　5） Establish predictable, equitable, flexible and transparent 
funding mechanisms
　6） Demonstrate sustainability, transparency, accountability 
and results
　7）Foster multi-stakeholder approaches to development
　8）Engage Canadians in development
　9）Save lives and alleviate suffering
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　It is not easy to explain why the Conservative’s attitude to-
wards CSOs changed under the last minister Paradis. One ex-
planation by Brown （2018） is that it was a response to the 
Province of Quebec’s own development initiatives, including the 
establishment of Agence québécoise de solidarité international, 
the crisis in Harper government’s relations with CSOs and to 
gain support in Quebec. Other hypothesis I heard from my civil 
society friends include; Paradis was more committed to interna-
tional development and had expertise on it compared to his 
predecessors Oda and Julian Fantino （in office from July 2012 
to July 2013）, Paradis wanted to ease the difficult relations with 
CSOs as general election was upcoming, and that Paradis had 
genuine understandings on civil society voluntary actions be-
cause of the Lac-Mégantic rail disaster which took place in his 
riding in 2013.10
4 ． JUSTIN TRUDEAU’S LIBERAL GOVERNMENT, FIAP 
AND THE RENEWED CSO PARTNERSHIP POLICY
　At the general election held on October 19, 2015, the Liberal 
Party led by Justin Trudeau won a majority government. Un-
der the new Trudeau government, DFATD was renamed Glob-
al Affairs Canada （GAC）. With a Prime Minister saying “Cana-
da is back” and calling himself a feminist, there were hopes, 
especially from CSOs, that Canada’s aid policy would be trans-
formed into one that emphasizes poverty reduction, human 
rights and gender equality.
 
10 The author’s interview with CSOs in August-September 2017 and 
August-September 2019.
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4.1　International Assistance Review
　In May 2016, International Development Minister Ma-
rie-Claude Bibeau launched the International Assistance Review 
（IAR） with a discussion paper （GAC 2016a）. After saying that 
“Empowerment of women and girls and the protection and 
promotion of their rights through advancing gender equality 
will be at the heart of Canada’s international assistance” and 
that the feminist lens would be applied （Ibid.: 10）, the paper 
named five “policy issues”; 1） health and rights of women and 
children, 2） clean economic growth and climate change, 3） gov-
ernance, pluralism, diversity and human rights, 4） peace and 
security, and 5） responding to humanitarian crises and the 
needs of displaced populations.
　During the IAR, GAC organized more than 300 consultation 
events in 65 countries with 15,000 participants, and there were 
more than 10,000 public comments （GAC 2016b）. There were 
about 80 submissions from CSOs during the IAR process 
（CCIC 2016）. In a report titled “What We Heard”  （GAC 
2016b）, the GAC summarized inputs. Among them were;
・ Make the empowerment of women and girls and gender 
equality a stand-alone priority.
・Apply feminist lens to all international assistance works.
・ Engage a full spectrum of stakeholders, including men and 
boys.
・Make bold funding for women’s rights movements.
4.2　Feminist International Assistance Policy （FIAP）
　Bibeau announced the Feminist International Assistance Poli-
cy （FIAP） on June 9, 2017 （GAC 2017a）. FIAP reflected many 
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of the inputs through the IAR. The policy said that Canada 
would adopt a feminist approach to international development 
and that;
　 A feminist approach to international assistance recognizes 
that promotion of gender equality and the empowerment of 
women and girls require the transformation of social norms 
and power relations. This objective is also essential for the 
achievement of all other development priorities （GAC 2017a）.
FIAP names the following “action areas;” 
　1） （core） gender equality and the empowerment of women 
and girls
　2） human dignity 
　3） growth that works for everyone 
　4） environment and climate action 
　5） inclusive governance
　6） peace and security. 
　In FIAP, the following commitments were made;
・ By 2021-22 no less than 95 percent of Canada’s bilateral in-
ternational development assistance initiatives will target （15 
percent） or integrate （80 percent） gender equality and the 
empowerment of women and girls.
・ To dedicate $150 million over five years to support local 
women’s organizations and movements that advance wom-
en’s rights in developing countries.
・ To provide $100 million over five years for small and medi-
um-sized Canadian CSOs.
　FIAP explicitly commits to gender equality, erased in the 
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Harper government and changed to “equality between men and 
women” （Tiessen and Swan 2018）. FIAP was welcomed by 
CSOs as new and innovative （CCIC 2017a）, but it was not free 
from concerns, criticisms and limitations. These include;
・ FIAP did not explicitly define feminism, and it seemed to be 
based on instrumental rather than a transformative approach 
to feminism （Brown and Swiss 2017; Tiessen 2019; Tiessen 
and Black 2019）.
・ There was no mention on LGTBQ rights in FIAP （Tiessen 
2019; Tiessen and Black 2019）.
・ A critical issue was financial resources for implementing 
FIAP. After the Trudeau government came into office, the 
aid budget showed a minor increase in the 2016 federal bud-
get and no increase in 2017. FIAP did not make any commit-
ment on increase of aid budget, quite in contrast with the 
Defence Policy （announced one day before FIAP’s announce-
ment） which said that in the coming ten years defence bud-
get would be increased by 70% （Brown and Swiss 2017; Ties-
sen and Swan 2018; Tomlinson 2017; Takayanagi 2018）. 
　 After the announcement of FIAP, in the 2018 federal budget, 
a $2 billion increase of aid budget over the following five 
years was proposed, but in the 2019 budget, there was only a 
minor increase.
・ Another concern was expertise. During the Harper govern-
ment, when the language shifted from “gender equality” to 
“equality between men and women,” mid-level people in 
CIDA contributed to keeping gender-related programs not 
very different （Tiessen 2016）. But gender experts gradually 
left CIDA and the amalgamated DFATD. （Takayanagi 2018）.
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　It is vital to see how well FIAP “translates in to practice” 
（Tiessen and Swan 2018）. Several signature programs have 
been established after the announcement of FIAP. Common to 
all the signature programs is that they involved CSOs, either 
Canadian, local, or both.
　On May 25, 2018, Bibeau announced that Canada “will launch 
consultations on the creation of a unique partnership to cata-
lyze new investments in support of gender equality and wom-
en’s rights in developing countries” with the government’s com-
mitment to contribute up to $300 million to such a partnership 
of the government, CSOs, philanthropic community and the pri-
vate sector （GAC 2018b）. After about a year of consultations 
and call for interests, Minister Maryam Monsef,11 the Minister 
of International Development and the Minister for Women and 
Gender Equality announced on June 2, 2019, that the Depart-
ment for Women and Gender Equality would commit $30 mil-
lion to provide funding to women’s organizations in Canada, and 
that the GAC would invest $300 million in a consortium, the 
Equality Fund （GAC 2019b） which will support women’s move-
ments and women’s rights groups in developing countries. The 
Equality Fund is a consortium of CSOs （Match International 
Women’s Fund as the lead agency,12 Oxfam Canada and 
WUSC）, Canadian women’s movement groups, philanthropic or-
ganizations and the private sector.  
 
11 Monsef became the Minister for Women and Gender Equality on 
January 10, 2017 and the Minister for International Development on 
March 1, 2019. On the same day Bibeau became the Minister of 
Agriculture.
12 Match officially announced in October 2019 that its name will be 
changed to the Equality Fund.
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　On June 4, 2019, Trudeau announced that “the Government 
of Canada will raise its funding to reach $1.4 billion annually, 
starting in 2023, to support women’s and girls’ health around 
the world” （Trudeau 2019）. GAC will invest approximately 
$325 million over five years to promote the health and rights of 
women and girls around the world （GAC 2019c）.13 In late-Au-
gust 2019, a call for proposals （$325 million over five years） 
was announced （GAC 2019c）. 
　Starting from Bibeau’s announcement of the program in Haiti 
in February 2018 （GAC 2018a）, the GAC has contributed, as of 
August 2019, $174 million for Women’s Voice and Leadership 
Program in 32 projects in 30 countries with 21 partners. The 
program aims to strengthen the capacity of women’s rights or-
ganizations to program and advocate to advance gender equali-
ty and the empowerment of women and girls. （GAC 2019d）
　A smaller but an important program announced on February 
7, 2019, by Bibeau was a new fund to support LGBTQ2 rights; 
in over five years $30 million will be funded to Canadian CSOs 
that collaborate with developing country partners, developing 
countries’ local and regional organizations and partnerships or 
multilateral initiatives that work on policy, advocacy and re-
search efforts on LGBTQ2 rights （GAC 2019a）.
 
13 Harper government emphasized support for maternal health, newborn 
and child health （MNCH）. Muskoka Initiative for supporting MNCH 
was proposed at the G7 Summit in 2010. MNCH by the Harper 
government was criticized for not addressing the root causes 
including gender inequality and exclusion of funding safe abortion 
（Swiss and Barry 2017; Keast 2017）. By explicitly mentioning sexual 
reproductive health rights, Trudeau’s Liberal government’s framing is 
completely different from Harper government’s MNCH.
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　Besides the signature programs, Canada, according to the 
OECD/DAC data （OECD 2019b）, has made progress in aid in 
support of gender equality and women’s empowerment. While 
gender-focused aid was 69% （3%: significant objective; 66%: pri-
mary objective） in 2016, it went up to 87% （fourth among the 
DAC members; 13%: significant objective; 74%: primary objec-
tive） in 2017.
4.3　Civil Society Partnership Policy
　FIAP also committed to updating the 2015 civil society part-
nership policy. In late-August 2017, the GAC circulated the 
draft around CSOs and asked for comments.14
　On September 27, 2017, Bibeau announced the renewed poli-
cy at the CCIC conference. The new “Canada’s Policy for Civil 
Society Partnerships for International Assistance: A Feminist 
Approach” （CSO policy） acknowledged CSOs as independent 
development actors in their own right and described many 
roles for CSOs. It names five guiding principles （FIAP, The 
2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, ODAAA, “human 
rights and inclusivity,” and the Istanbul Principles for CSO De-
velopment Effectiveness）. Here, while the other four are exist-
 
14 GAC did not plan consultations for this document because during the 
IAR there were a lot of comments regarding CSO-GAC partnerships. 
CSOs, while complaining about the draft being circulated at the time 
many staff members were taking holidays, and were asked for 
feedback in quite a short time （two weeks with later one week 
extension） also preferred early renewal of the policy rather than 
another round of consultations. （Author’s interviews with the GAC 
and CSOs in August and September 2017）. The draft was not put on 
GAC’s website.
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ing policies or documents, “human rights and inclusivity” explic-
itly acknowledges the roles of CSOs in promoting human rights-
based approaches in development by saying, “Canada is 
committed to supporting international assistance policies and 
programs that are grounded in a human rights-based approach. 
Human rights principles of equality and non-discrimination, par-
ticipation and inclusion, and transparency and accountability 
are integrated in Canada’s international assistance.” 
　Then the CSO policy identified nine objectives; 
　1） Reduce poverty by empowering women and girls and 
promoting gender equality
　2） Facilitate a safe and enabling environment for civil society
　3） Protect human life and dignity
　4） Foster CSOs leadership in innovation
　5） Integrate CSOs as independent CSOs into international 
assistance programming
　6） Establish more predictable, equitable, flexible and trans-
parent funding mechanisms
　7） Foster multi-stakeholder approaches to international assis-
tance
　8） Engage Canadians in international assistance
　9） Promote sustainability, transparency, accountability and 
results （GAC 2017b）. 
　One significance of the CSO policy, compared to the 2015 pol-
icy, is that the objectives had “action area examples,” which 
listed possible measures the GAC and CSOs could take. 
　Compared to the draft, reflecting comments by CCIC （2017b） 
and other CSOs, the Istanbul Principles was added as one of 
the guiding principles, and several action area examples were 
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either amended or added.
　In February 2018, Advisory Group to Support Implementa-
tion of the Civil Society Partnerships for International Assis-
tance Policy: A Feminist Approach （CPAG） was established to 
advise the GAC on the implementation of the CSO policy. 
CPAG is composed of members from both CSOs and the GAC. 
CPAG first worked on objectives 1, 6 and 8 and then worked 
on the other six. I learned during my visit to Canada in August 
and September 2019 that the final report would be published 
sometime in September and that the report would not include 
recommendations on funding schemes.15 At the time of writing 
this article （January 2020）, CPAG has finalized the CSO policy’s 
implementation plan, and its final report has been approved by 
the GAC senior management, but it has not been made public. 
CPAG is discussing its dissemination plan, and after it is final-
ized, the report will be made public. CPAG will probably con-
tinue as a group to monitor the implementation of the report.16 
CONCLUSION
　At the general election on October 21, 2019, Justin Trudeau’s 
Liberal Party won a minority government. In the new Cabinet, 
which came into office on November 20, Karina Gould became 
the new Minister of International Development. FIAP and the 
CSO Policy would stay as the frameworks for aid policy and 
CSO-GAC partnerships. It took almost two years since the 
 
15 The author’s interview with CSOs and the GAC in August and 
September 2019.
16 The author’s E-mail communication with CCIC, October 2019 and 
January 2020.
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Trudeau government came into office in November 2015 to es-
tablish the new FIAP and the CSO policy, and it was almost 
before the following election was called that many of FIAP’s 
signature programs were announced. The Trudeau govern-
ment “did little to clear up continuing problems” for CSOs in 
government funding predictability （Smillie and Sanchez 2018）. 
　What are the lessons we could draw from the Canadian expe-
rience? First, even in “like-minded” or “CSO-friendly” countries, 
there are always tensions between policies and practices that 
respect CSOs as independent actors in their own right and en-
abling them to operate based on CSOs’ own objectives and pri-
orities and that control or instrumentalize CSOs based on do-
nors’ policies and priorities. Second, the scene could change, and 
the relationship could deteriorate with the change of the gov-
ernment, especially to conservative ones like the Harper gov-
ernment. But as being non-partisan is a requirement for CSOs 
in many countries, they cannot explicitly state which party （or 
parties） would provide a favourable environment for them. 
Third, as a result of a long partnership between CSOs and the 
former CIDA, CSOs in Canada became over-dependent on gov-
ernment funding and vulnerable to changes such as what hap-
pened under the Harper government. Northeast Asian CSOs, 
while strengthening partnerships with their governments’ aid 
agencies, should also always diversify their funding sources.
　What can the Northeast Asian donors learn from the Canadi-
an experience, especially the recent developments? The OECD, 
drawing lessons from the peer reviews, advises the members to 
have an overarching civil society policy or strategy （OECD 
2012）. Canada’s CSO policy （and the previous VSP and the 
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2015 policy） is an example of an overarching civil society poli-
cy,17 and the （new） CSO policy explicitly mentions that CSOs 
are important development actors in their own right and em-
phasizes human rights-based approaches and gender equality. 
While Korea recently launched a CSO-specific policy framework 
（KCOC and KOICA 2019）, Taiwan and Japan are encouraged 
to have such policies.
　Northeast Asian donors could also learn from the IAR and 
CPAG processes how to engage CSOs and the public in general 
in policy-making. Inputs from CSOs and other actors have 
made the FIAP quite different from the discussion paper at the 
launch of the IAR. 
　Finally, Canada, through FIAP’s signature programs, has 
committed to supporting women’s movements, women’s rights 
groups and LGBTQ2 rights groups; and to work on sexual and 
reproductive health and rights, which are all sensitive in a cer-
tain number of partner countries. The government of Japan has 
tended to avoid supporting CSOs working on diplomatically 
sensitive issues. But I would argue that an important role for 
donor countries’ CSO-government partnership is to support ini-
tiatives in the civil society of partner countries that are working 
on issues that are sensitive in government-to-government aid.
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